showed the importance of multilateral resistance general equilibrium effects in estimating the response of trade flows to trade costs. We integrate this into Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein's (2008) extension of Anderson and van Wincoop's framework, which allows for firm heterogeneity, in order to quantify the different margins of adjustment. For bilateral trade cost changes, the general equilibrium effects are small. Surprisingly, most country pairs reduce their trade after a multilateral fall in trade costs. The global trade response to lower costs is positive, amplified by firm entry, but significantly dampened by multilateral resistance.
I. Introduction
H OW do changes in trade frictions affect trade flows? The answer to this question is important for understanding the welfare implications of trade liberalizations. This paper sheds light on this issue by examining comparative statics in a gravity model that integrates two forces, multilateral resistance (MR) and firm heterogeneity, that were introduced in two important papers in the literature.
In the first paper, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, hereafter AvW) solve the so-called border puzzle-the implausibly large negative effect of the U.S.-Canadian border on trade between U.S. states and Canadian provinces highlighted by McCallum (1995) . AvW demonstrate that traditional gravity equations capture the impact of only bilateral trade costs on trade flows but ignore the fact that regions operate in a multilateral world. As a result, traditional estimates fail to control for theoretically motivated price terms, which aggregate both domestic and international trade costs and therefore capture MR. AvW show that bilateral trade flows depend on bilateral trade costs relative to MR. Failing to account for MR typically leads one to overstate the importance of changes in trade barriers on bilateral trade flows. Since then, further work has studied the general equilibrium interplay of trade costs, trade flows, and income. 1 The second paper on which we draw is Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008, hereafter HMR) . Heterogeneous firm productivity within a country means that not all firms are productive enough to cover the fixed costs of exporting. 2 If fixed costs are high enough, no firms in a given country may find it profitable to export to a given destination. Hence, in the presence of fixed costs of trade, "zeros" naturally arise in the trade data-a country selection effect. 3 In HMR's data, which we also use, the proportion of countries that do not trade with each other or trade in only one direction is around half of all observations. HMR explore a further implication. With heterogeneous firm productivity and fixed costs of trade, a fall in variable trade costs makes exporting firms export more but also induces new firms to export. These two effects are referred to as the intensive and the extensive margins, respectively. HMR argue that failure to account for firm heterogeneity causes standard gravity estimation to conflate the impact of trade costs on these two margins.
However, in performing their counterfactual exercise, HMR abstracted from the general equilibrium effects of trade cost changes and from the way in which these forces interact with the intensive and extensive margins that those authors distinguish. On the other hand, papers emphasizing MR have neglected the implications of firm heterogeneity. Our contribution computes general equilibrium comparative statics in a gravity model that marries the two strands of the literature and facilitates implementation in large cross-country data sets.
Our work is similar to that of Egger et al. (2011) , who demonstrate biases that arise from neglecting the general equilibrium impact of changes in trade costs in the context of multiple preferential trade agreements. In that study, estimation addresses the issues of endogeneity, country selection, and MR, but only the last of these is also accounted for in comparative statics. 4 We present our hybrid AvW-HMR gravity model in section II, which applies AvW general equilibrium closure to the extensive and intensive margins of trade. In section III, we study the theoretical comparative statics in a special case of our hybrid model-a frictionless initial equilibrium-which helps us to illustrate the mechanisms at work in the empirical comparative statics we subsequently compute. Here we show that comparative statics will in general comprise three terms: an intensive margin capturing the firm-level response to trade cost changes, an extensive margin capturing the effects of firm entry, and an adjustment term that captures the effects of MR. We show that changes in trade flows at the extensive margin are also dampened by MR in a general equilibrium setting. These comparative statics are useful for building intuition but inappropriate for empirical implementation. In particular, the frictionless initial equilibrium is unrealistic and cannot generate the zeros and asymmetries observed in the trade data.
Hence, section IV develops and empirically implements a Taylor approximation for capturing comparative static MR effects. We adapt Baier and Bergstrand's (2009) approach to a setting that includes firm heterogeneity and accounts for zeros in trade flows, centering the approximation at an initial equilibrium with positive asymmetric trade frictions. Compared to AvW, Baier and Bergstrand (BB) show that the approximation error is small for the vast majority of country pairs, and we believe the approach has a number of advantages over alternative computational methods. First, it preserves the possibility of analyzing bilaterally asymmetric trade costs, which can explain asymmetric trade flows. In such settings, Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2012) show that BB's flexible method is competitive with a computational approach (like AvW's) that assumes bilateral symmetry in trade costs. Second, this method does not require an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between product varieties, which has a large effect on general equilibrium comparative static outcomes (Bergstrand et al., 2012) . Third, BB's approach is useful for gaining intuition about the effects at work when trade costs change. We show in a heterogeneous firms setting that multilateral resistance can be represented by three terms that are linear in trade costs, capturing world trade resistance, importer MR, and exporter MR. Having an analytically tractable expression makes the mechanics behind the comparative statics exercises transparent.
After replicating the estimation exercise in HMR, our counterfactual analysis decomposes overall trade flow elasticities into effects operating at the intensive margin, the extensive margin, and through multilateral resistance effects. Section IV continues by illustrating the relative quantitative importance of each effect by means of three novel comparative static results.
First, we analyze the case of two countries changing their bilateral trade costs. We find that firm heterogeneity will tend to raise trade elasticities, while MR effects are typically small for most country pairs. Firm heterogeneity together with fixed costs of exporting imply the presence of an extensive margin of trade that amplifies country-level trade responses above those found in standard models. MR works against this, but the effects are muted. So for practical empirical purposes, we find that ignoring MR is relatively innocuous for the majority of country pairs when only two countries change their trade costs in isolation. Furthermore, we show that bilateral liberalizations will tend to generate smaller trade responses at the extensive margin for larger exporting countries, as there is less scope for firm entry to take place for these exporters, compared to smaller exporters, in response to trade liberalizations. This means that smaller countries tend to enjoy larger trade responses overall when trade costs change bilaterally. The average response indicates that around half the trade flow response operates through the extensive margin of trade.
Second, we turn to multilateral changes in trade costs by analyzing the case where all countries reduce their international trade frictions. Just as for bilateral trade cost reductions, the extensive margin raises trade elasticities, but now the effects of MR are much more important. Because multilateral liberalizations imply small changes in relative trade costs for any given country pair, trade elasticities net of MR are much smaller. Surprisingly, we show analytically that bilateral elasticities can become negative and empirically that this is true for most country pairs. That is, multilateral trade liberalization will tend to redirect output across destinations, reducing exports to some locations but increasing trade with others. The pattern of responses is such that trade between smaller countries tends to become redirected to larger importers. The reason is that while bilateral trade becomes more attractive, actual trade flows depend on the costs incurred in this trade relative to other destinations. Because bigger importers are less affected by MR, multilateral changes imply many changes in relative prices that tend to favor exporting to larger importers over smaller importers. 5 Third, we study the response of world trade to multilateral changes in trade costs by aggregating the bilateral elasticities that properly capture the general equilibrium effects of MR. Our main finding here is that the dampening effect of MR dominates the amplification generated at the extensive margin. The elasticity net of general equilibrium considerations is around one-third the size of the aggregate trade elasticity that ignores relative price effects and less than 40% of those implied by standard models. In this empirical application, country entry makes no contribution to the increase in world trade, and the role of firm entry is modest. The key results are summarized in section V.
II. The Model
The basis of our study is the gravity model proposed by AvW and extended by HMR to include firm heterogeneity. The environment is one in which CES consumers within a set of endowment economies demand differentiated products produced by monopolistically competitive firms that differ according to their unit costs. The crucial feature of the HMR gravity setup is the presence of fixed costs of exporting. This generates selection into exporting by the lowest-cost firms only. In some cases, trade costs can be so high that no firms in a given country export to a particular destination. This generates both firm selection and country selection into trade, and the latter explains the presence of zeros in bilateral trade data.
For brevity, we do not repeat the derivation of HMR's gravity equation here. We begin where HMR left off. Their gravity equation relates imports by country i from N j firms in country j to variable "iceberg" trade costs t ij , the fixed total output of the importer Y i , an index of inward multilateral resistance in the importer P i , and a selection term V ij , which measures the proportion of firms in j that actively export to country i:
(See HMR's equation [6] .) In this equation, σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties, α ≡ 1 − (1/σ), and c j captures unit labor costs in exporter j. 6 We follow AvW in solving for the endogenous unit costs by closing the model through assuming a trade balance for each country. This says that the total output of each exporter must equal the sum of imports across all importing destinations, Y j = i∈I j M ij , where set I j denotes the set of countries that import from country j. Using trade balance, HMR's gravity equation is
Thus, solving for unit factor costs and substituting back into the gravity equation yields 7
in which the indices of inward multilateral resistance P i and outward multilateral resistance P j are
We define Y I j ≡ i∈I j Y i as the total output of all importers from country j. It differs from AvW's notation only to the extent that fixed costs of exporting mean that country j firms will not export to all destinations. Using this notation, we similarly define s
i is the output share of country i as a fraction of the total output of all countries that import from j, I j . We define the set J i 6 In AvW, the equivalent term is their "small p." 7 A full derivation is given in the online technical appendix to this paper.
analogously-as the set of all exporters to country i. Following our convention, we then define s
J i as the output of country j as a share of the total output of all exporters to country i, J i . 8 Variable trade costs are weakly greater than unity between countries (t ij ≥ 1 for i = j) but are exactly unity for trade within countries (t ij = 1 for i = j). We do not require that variable trade costs are bilaterally symmetric, which is important for capturing asymmetric trade flow patterns. Finally, the selection term V ij would reduce to a constant in the absence of fixed costs of trade. In the presence of fixed costs, variation in the extensive margin of trade will contribute directly to variation in aggregate bilateral trade flows M ij and indirectly because the MR terms are also a function of the extensive margin.
How is the extensive margin of trade determined? In HMR's setup, there exists a unit cost level above which firms in j find it too costly to export to i, which we denote by a ij . Imposing general equilibrium closure as we do allows us to write this cost cut-off as a function of outputs, trade costs, and MR terms. Interestingly, it takes a gravity-like form,
where f ij are the fixed costs of exporting from country j to country i. Hence a consequence of requiring general equilibrium closure is that the extensive margin can be expressed in a convenient form akin to equation (1) for bilateral exports. Intuitively, higher fixed costs of trade reduce the cost cut-off, so fewer firms in j export to i. In addition, the cost level above which firms in j cannot export to i rises as the product of the two countries' outputs rises, as bilateral trade costs fall, or as MR rises. The fact that MR enters equation (4) 
where
. HMR relate the cost cut-off a ij to a latent variable Z ij , which is the ratio of the variable profits of 8 Note that as long as the sets of active traders {J i , I j } are fixed, as for the comparative statics we consider (see below), GDP shares will also be constant. We therefore abstract from effects that trade cost changes might have on aggregate output shares, {s Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and AvW for similar setups. Anderson and Yotov (2011) compute terms of trade effects arising from trade liberalization, which would have implications for real income and therefore world GDP shares to the extent that these effects are asymmetric. the lowest-cost firm a L in j to the fixed costs of exporting. It is related to the cost cut-off according to
In our general equilibrium setting, this latent variable is in turn related to MR through equation (4). In particular, we can write
In turn, this allows us to write the selection term in equation (5) as
where δ ≡ (k − σ + 1)/(σ − 1). Equations (1) and (7) then make clear that the comparative static effects of trade costs will operate through three channels. First, changes in variable trade costs will affect bilateral trade through the intensive margin, captured by the t ij term in equation (1). Second, to the extent that changes in trade costs also affect the cost of trading with alternative export destinations, the multilateral resistances in equation (1) will change, tending to oppose the direct effects of changes in trade costs through t ij . Third, changes in variable trade costs will also affect the extensive margin of trade through V ij . This final effect is also subject to competing forces. It comprises both direct effects of changes in trade costs through the t ij term in the numerator of equation (4), which by equation (6) will affect the extensive margin in equation (7), together with indirect effects through the MR terms that enter equation (4). As in the aggregate trade flow equation (1), the MR effects operating through the extensive margin will tend to oppose the direct effects of trade costs through the extensive margin, providing some dampening effect. Overall, then, valid comparative statics must account for these two sources of effects of MR on trade flows. The log of equation (1) gives the log-gravity equation,
where lowercase denotes logs and where we follow HMR in capturing ln V ij by
We denote the extensive margin elasticity by ϕ ij ≡ ∂w ij / ∂z ij = δe δz ij /(e δz ij − 1), which captures the effects of changes in factors determining the latent variable z ij on the proportion of firms exporting. Since we will be interested in the effects of changes in trade costs on countries of different sizes, it is useful to state the following result: Proof. See the online appendix.
This result highlights one source of heterogeneity across countries' responses to changes in trade frictions: the extensive margin of trade. The smaller the exporter, the greater the extent to which firm entry is encouraged following a trade liberalization. Intuitively, smaller, more remote exporters have more scope for expanding the number of exporting firms than large, well-connected traders, so the effect is more muted for larger exporters. The extensive margin is not the only source of heterogeneity in countries' responses to changes in trade costs, however. As we show next, multilateral resistance also materially affects the response of trade flows to trade liberalizations.
III. Comparative Statics in a Frictionless World
Before we turn to the empirical implementation of our model, we study its properties in a simplified setting-around a frictionless initial equilibrium. At the end of the section II, we showed how country size drives heterogeneity in trade responses at the extensive margin. In this section, we illustrate how country size drives heterogeneous responses of trade flows through multilateral resistance. The frictionless case is useful to illustrate these general equilibrium effects in a way that abstracts from heterogeneity at the extensive margin.
The thought experiment we perform is identical to one AvW considered in their framework, which abstracts from firm heterogeneity. To draw a comparison with their results, consider a frictionless world in which variable trade costs t ij = 1 for all i, j and in which all countries trade such that I j = J i . The support of a is such that all firms in country i export and that V ij = 1 for all i, j at the initial equilibrium. In this world, importer and exporter multilateral resistances are symmetric and equal to unity, as in AvW's example. Using equations (4) and (5) in the equilibrium we describe, a change in trade costs implies
A rise in bilateral variable trade costs would reduce the number of firms exporting. But these effects are dampened to the extent that multilateral trade costs also rise, as captured by the third term. As is the case in standard gravity models at the intensive margin, a higher elasticity of substitution between products implies a large impact of trade costs on trade flows.
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In the case of equation (10), however, the effect here is at the extensive margin, or the number of firms exporting. This standard effect is multiplied by ϕ = δ(1 + k), which reflects the degree of heterogeneity across firms. When this is large, the extent of firm entry (or exit) following trade cost changes is also large. When we use equation (10) in equation (1), a general expression for the effect of a change in trade costs on trade flows evaluated at the initial frictionless equilibrium is then given by
which we can use to understand the components of trade flow comparative statics. Just as the expression for comparative statics at the extensive margin in equation (10), equation (11) shows that comparative statics on overall trade flows between exporter j and importer i will comprise an intensive margin captured by σ − 1, some amplification due to firm exit at the extensive margin due to the factor 1 + ϕ > 1, together with some dampening due to multilateral resistance 1
The last effect captures the general equilibrium repercussions of changes in trade frictions on average importer resistance and average exporter resistance. On the importer side, trade flows are dampened to the extent that cheaper varieties may now be available from elsewhere (from exporters other than j), while on the exporter side, dampening may occur because alternative export destinations may now be relatively more attractive (importers other than i). 9 We can gain further insight by continuing to explore the MR adjustment term. Using equation (10), we totally differentiate the system of price indices given by equations (2) and (3) with respect to variable trade costs. Evaluating at the frictionless equilibrium yields
Combining these two expressions results in the total differential of the MR terms:
This equation summarizes the behavior of endogenously determined MR to exogenous changes in trade costs. It says 9 While we emphasize the general equilibrium effect as operating through P j , this exporter MR term may be thought of as capturing effects through factor costs, which are endogenous. In particular, a fall in P j corresponds to a rise in c j . See the expression above equation (1), which we used to solve for and eliminate c j .
that a rise in average trade costs across all import and export destinations tends to raise MR, stimulating bilateral trade between i and j (second and third terms), but that the average world trade resistance has also risen, tending to reduce bilateral trade (first term).
Consider first bilateral changes in trade costs. For a bilateral change, let dt lh = dt hl = dt for l, h = i, j, or else let dt lh = 0. Then when we use equation (11), GDP-weighted exports change according to
Note that firm heterogeneity provides an amplification factor through the term (1 + ϕ) when trade costs change, tending to raise the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs relative to AvW's homogeneous firms case. We can also see from this expression that whenever s i < 1/2, larger countries experience smaller trade elasticities under bilateral change in trade costs. Moreover, the effects of MR will typically be small under bilateral changes in trade costs, as the term 1 + 2s i s j − s i − s j will typically be close to unity. Intuitively, since only one set of trade costs changes under bilateral liberalization, relative price changes are captured fairly well by absolute price changes, such that only a small adjustment due to MR is required. Consider next the effect of a multilateral change in trade costs, as in AvW, such that dt ij = dt > 0 for all i = j, and dt ii = 0 for all i. Using equation (11) and our expressions for the total differentials in equations (10) and (14), we note that GDP-weighted exports change according to
This corresponds precisely to AvW's system (see their equation [15]), with the addition of a term reflecting firm heterogeneity, ϕ. Compared to their model, the firm heterogeneity term means the trade elasticity will be larger by a factor 1 + ϕ > 1. But as in AvW's model, it is the case that MR dampens the effects of multilateral trade cost changes, and by more for smaller countries. As such, larger countries experience larger trade elasticities under multilateral changes in trade costs. The sign of the net effect of a trade liberalization in exports is ambiguous in this world, and the source of this ambiguity is the effect of MR through the term − l s 2 l +s j +s i . Small country pairs (for which s i +s j is small) may well have negative bilateral elasticities. In principle, firm heterogeneity will magnify the impact of any negative elasticities arising from MR.
The analysis around the frictionless equilibrium has introduced the intuition for our main results. Firm heterogeneity introduces an additional factor ϕ > 0 into trade elasticities. For bilateral changes in trade costs, MR effects could be minor, but for multilateral changes, MR effects could be sufficiently strong to make some trade elasticities negative.
We want to measure these effects, but the problem with implementing these theoretical expressions empirically is that the real world is obviously far from frictionless. To the contrary, trade costs are significant (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004) . Moreover, although the expressions above incorporate firm heterogeneity, we lose an important dimension of variation across countries because the ϕ term has no country-pair subscript. Finally, the expressions above do not allow the zeros in trade flows to play a role in determining likely trade responses. As is clear from equations (2) and (3), zeros in the trade data imply that the indices of MR should be adjusted to account for the sets of active traders. Concretely, this means that the output shares captured by the s j terms in the expressions above should be computed with respect to the sets of countries with which exporters actually trade when trade elasticities are generated rather than all countries in the world.
IV. Empirical Comparative Statics
For estimation purposes, the methodology developed in HMR deals with firm heterogeneity, and country fixed effects control for importer and exporter multilateral resistance. 10 We replicate HMR's approach to estimation. For comparative statics however, we adapt Baier and Bergstrand's (BB, 2009) "bonus vetus OLS" (BVOLS) approach method for approximating MR effects to a heterogeneous firms setting. In a homogeneous firms setting, BB accomplish this by taking a Taylor approximation for the nonlinear MR terms around a world of symmetric but positive trade frictions. Their method allows us to expunge the endogenous components from the right-hand side of the MR terms, such that approximate comparative statics are straightforward to implement.
AvW use a computational procedure to solve for MR explicitly and compute comparative statics. Despite awareness of this procedure and the first-order consequences of MR, the approach of AvW has not been applied to crosscountry data sets typically used in empirical applications of the gravity model. 11 This is largely due to the difficulty in implementation, which requires a customized program. Our application would be especially complex because the system we study includes asymmetric bilateral trade costs, firm selection, and different sets of active traders for different trading country pairs. 10 The use of exporter and importer fixed effects in estimation is acknowledged by AvW, Baier & Bergstrand (2009), and Feenstra (2004) to be the most reliable estimation method in this context. 11 To our knowledge, the most ambitious exercise is that of Egger et al. (2011) , who allow for MR comparative statics and other factors on a data set of 128 countries. Other contributions are still limited to modeling U.S. and Canadian regions together with a limited set of additional countries or an aggregate for the rest of the world (AvW; Anderson & Yotov, 2010 Behrens et al., 2009) . All of these studies conduct counterfactuals on binary variables like borders or free trade agreements and not the broader class of continuous trade cost proxies. Behar, Nelson, and Manners (2013) apply the methods developed here to the case of logistics.
Like BB, our primary motive is to present a practical approach to computing comparative statics that has low barriers to implementation in empirical gravity work. It successfully corrects for the first-order inaccuracies associated with the general equilibrium effects of trade cost changes. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) show that their approximation is good for the majority of region pairs that they consider. In particular, comparative statics of economic integration based on the Taylor method are within 10% of the AvW approach for 83% of their pairs. Bergstrand et al. (2012) provide Monte Carlo evidence that the trade flow comparative statics computed using a Taylor approach are close to those generated using nonlinear solvers. This is despite using a version of BVOLS for estimation that, while better for comparative statics, starts with the handicap of being biased at the estimation stage. Furthermore, the accuracy of comparative statics improves as the number of countries increases. Therefore, using fixed effects rather than standard OLS with MR terms in estimation while using BVOLS for comparative statics in a large cross-section of countries, as we do, would yield even better performance.
Further, the approach does not require us to assume particular values for structural parameters like the elasticity of substitution, σ. Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2012) show that comparative statics are very sensitive to the choice of this elasticity parameter and that the AvW approach is inaccurate when the assumed elasticity is different from the actual elasticity. 12 A final advantage of the BB method is its intuitive appeal. This, combined with the frictionless case just considered, allows us to be clearer about the mechanisms that lie behind the comparative statics we produce. 13 To apply BB's method to the case of firm heterogeneity, we make the following assumption for the purposes of comparative statics: 14
Assumption 1: The extensive margin terms V ij entering the indices of multilateral resistance
12 Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and Keeney (2007) discuss the wide range of σ estimates and the sensitivity of general equilibirum comparative statics to the value of σ.
13 Note that following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and most dynamic macroeconomic models, we will consider a first-order Taylor approximation to the multilateral resistance terms. A first-order approximation will allow us to obtain analytical solutions but rules out interactions between distance and other trade costs in the MR terms.
14 The assumption is not required for the purposes of estimation, so HMR's empirical procedure is not affected.
15 HMR make a similar assumption in their appendix II. They do so for V ij in the main gravity equation, while we do so only in the price index terms. Furthermore, they assume that the ij component of V ij is symmetric. Their assumption is that V ij = φ ij φ i φ j 1−σ , in which φ ij = φ ji , while φ i and φ j are importer-and exporter-specific effects. The assumption that φ ij = φ ji precludes asymmetric trade flows, and for that reason is rejected by the authors. By contrast, we do not impose such symmetry. In particular, we allow for φ ij = φ ji around our center. In our case, this implies it is possible that Z ij = Z ji .
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When this is used, a Taylor expansion of importer and exporter multilateral resistances yields a tractable expression for trade resistance that comprises three terms:
in which z ij ≡ ln Z ij . This expression has three terms that, by analogy with equation (14), can be straightforwardly interpreted. First, to the extent that world trade resistance is high, MR between the i-j trading pair will be low, tending to discourage international trade on average. Second, to the extent that importer i faces high trade costs in obtaining output from other exporters in the set J i , exporter j will export more to i. Third, when exporter j finds it costly to export to other destinations in the set I j , it will tend to export more to i instead, all else equal. Hence, the expression above has a straightforward interpretation that makes clear the impact of relative trade costs on bilateral trade flows. Moreover, our expression for MR incorporates the effects of firm heterogeneity in two respects. First, trade resistance occurring through the extensive margin is captured by the presence of the z ij terms on the right-hand side. Their presence makes clear, for example, that MR is affected by the intensive and extensive margins. Together with our discussion of the role of MR in the extensive margin in section 3, this indicates a two-way interaction between MR and the margins of trade. Second, the relevant average trade costs that constitute MR in a world of firm heterogeneity are taken over the sets of active traders. This is clear from the fact that the summation terms are taken over the sets J i and I j . This will have important implications for comparative statics, as we will see below.
Our estimation procedure, which replicates that of HMR, involves a two-step process whereby a first-stage probit regression is estimated for the probability that country j exports to country i. This probability is then used to construct a control variable for the extensive margin, w ij , and the inverse Mills ratio as an additional control for country selection into trade. Both of these are used in the second-stage regression, which takes the form of an otherwise standard gravity equation in which fixed effects control for MR in estimation. Since the procedure and data are exactly as in HMR, we provide an overview of the data, method, and selected regression output in the online technical appendix.
We turn instead to the implementation of our comparative statics, for which we need three things. First, we need an estimate of the "firm-level" intensive margin elasticity of trade flows to trade costs. We proxy trade costs with a number of observable variables, and for the elasticity, we take an estimate of the coefficient on log distance, γ. Our analytical results will be in terms of changes in variable trade costs, assuming fixed costs stay constant, and we will interpret the empirical illustration in this way. However, observable proxies included in the probit stage could affect both fixed and variable costs. The empirical illustrations, which are computed for changes in distance, could therefore reflect changes in both costs. The estimates for the trade cost elasticities arê γ p = 0.66 in the probit model andγ = 0.799 in the secondstage regression. 16 Second, we need country-pair extensive margin elasticities ϕ ij = δe δz ij /(e δz ij − 1), the estimate of which we denote by ϕ ij . In turn, these terms contain estimates of z ij , a linear function of the variables in the probit model, together withδ = 0.72. The ϕ ij terms clearly vary by country pair and provide one source of cross-country variation in trade elasticities. Finally, to make the adjustments for MR, we need country GDP shares defined relative to the relevant sets of active traders, {s 
A. Gross Elasticities
Throughout our application, it will be interesting to compare gross elasticities, which do not account for MR, with net elasticities, which do. Because gross elasticities ignore MR, they will be identical for both bilateral and multilateral changes in trade costs. The gross elasticity for country pair i-j with respect to variable trade costs is ξ gross ij
where ξ
For the empirical analog of this elasticity based on a 10% fall in distance, ξ gross ij = γ(1 + ϕ ij ), we replicate the results from HMR in table 1. For reference, the first row includes the linear estimate, while the second row produces results from the NLS estimate derived from the Pareto assumption made in section II. The mean overall elasticity of 1.564 implies that the bilateral countrylevel effect is due roughly in equal parts to the intensive and extensive margins. The estimate is higher than would be implied by the linear OLS estimate or by estimates attempting to deal with country selection alone (1.21; see HMR). 16 We have made no theoretical distinction between the intensive margin γ and γ p = ∂ z * ij ∂dij , which is the distance coefficient from the probit estimate. Our simulations take account of this small difference. or linear analog for each pair. The total is from equation (20) This is important because it implies that one should allow for firm heterogeneity even if one is not interested in the decomposition of the overall gross effect into different margins of adjustment. 17 Cross-country variation in the extensive margin elasticities drives variation in the estimated gross elasticities, which have a standard deviation of 0.289. The variation is generated from variations in z * ij , which is monotonically related to the proportion of exporting firms. Small country pairs that are far apart will have a low probability of trading, which implies a low proportion of exporting firms and hence plenty of scope for firm entry after a reduction in trade costs, as shown in lemma 1.
This result is confirmed empirically in /∂ ln t ij > 0. For example, the correlation between the elasticity and log distance is 0.049. In addition to NLS estimates derived from the Pareto assumption, HMR also produce estimates derived from a polynomial function of z ij . We include these estimates to show that the implications for bilateral elasticities are similar, albeit with a larger standard deviation.
These estimates consider only actively trading pairs, but as is clear from the probit estimates, a fall in distance raises the predicted probability of a pair of countries trading. To translate this continuous effect on the probability into a comparative static simulation of binary country entry, a new trading pair is formed (expanding the set J i ) if the reduction in distance results in the most productive firm in j now being able to cover the fixed costs of exporting to i. Empirically this means that the predicted value of z ij after a fall in distance, z * ij , is positive when it previously was negative. Our analysis counts in how many cases pairs that were not previously trading now have z * ij > 0. For the default 10% fall in distance, not a single instance of country entry exists. Generating a case of country entry required fall in log distance of 0.31, or 27%. This implies that the distribution of distance and other observed and unobserved trade costs is such that it would take very large changes in trade costs to generate new trading pairs. This is consistent with the observation in HMR that very little of the increase in world trade observed over time is due to the formation of new trading pairs. Similarly, we considered a rise in trade costs, estimating that a rise in log distance of 0.35 would have no effect on country entry and a rise in log distance of 0.4 would cause only one trading pair to stop trading. The results imply that we do not need to consider changes in the sets of traders when studying the net elasticities for the baseline 10% change in trade costs that we do next.
B. Bilateral Changes in Trade Costs
Allowing trade costs to change bilaterally results in the following:
Implication 1 (bilateral changes in trade costs): With Taylor-approximated multilateral resistance terms, the elasticity of bilateral trade flows to bilateral (B) changes in variable trade costs is given by
where ξ B ij ≡ −dm ij /d ln t ij for country pair i-j. Bilateral trade elasticities are always decreasing in country size for bilateral changes in trade costs.
Proof. See the online appendix.
This is the empirical counterpart of the frictionless equation (15), which we implement by employing
using our estimated parameters. Table 2 shows this, together with an entry demonstrating MR in the linear case, which disregards firm heterogeneity, and an entry for the gross elasticity from section IVA, which disregards MR. Because most countries are small, bilateral changes in trade costs have small MR implications. In the linear case, on average, the dampening effect of MR is only −0.033, so the average bilateral elasticity is close to that implied by the linear estimate of γ. If we allow for firm heterogeneity but no MR, the comparative static effect is substantially larger. The average MR effect is 546 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ) elasticities are close together. As a result, the average amplifying effect of accounting for firm heterogeneity is much stronger than the dampening effect of MR when trade cost changes are bilateral.
It is intuitive for the average MR effect to be small since the average country is small. Since the essence of MR is to account for GDP-weighted changes in relative trade costs, bilateral changes between two typical countries have small general equilibrium effects. However, there are some exceptions. Table 3 illustrates this with specific country examples and includes the ratio ξ ratio for this pair is still sufficiently close to unity to suggest it is only "very" big countries for which MR matters for bilateral liberalizations.
However, our adjusting for actual trading partners implies lower net-to-gross ratios are also generated by small (and remote) exporters if they have a dominant importer. An extreme example in table 3 is Japan, which makes up almost three-quarters of importer GDP from Bhutan, so that the netto-gross ratio is only 0.26 for exports from the latter to the former. The table also contains some other examples. Thus, for bilateral changes in trade costs, MR effects are material for trade between the world's largest country pairs and exports from small exporters with few export destinations to the world's largest countries. But given the skewness in the distribution of country incomes, most country pairs are small and are therefore not materially affected by MR.
Since both the MR effect and the elasticity at the extensive margin are decreasing in country size, the impact of size on the trade elasticities is unambiguous in the case of bilateral changes in trade costs. Small country pairs will tend to experience larger elasticities, as demonstrated in implication 1. 
C. Multilateral Changes in Trade Costs
When all countries reduce trade costs, we find that:
Implication 2 (multilateral changes in trade costs): With Taylor-approximated multilateral resistance terms, the elasticity of bilateral trade flows to multilateral changes (M) in variable trade costs is given by
a. After accounting for effects through multilateral resistance, it is the case that
such that the sign of the elasticity of bilateral trade is ambiguous. b. (i) If the extensive margin is held constant (ϕ ij = 0), 
such that the relationship between country size and the country-level bilateral export elasticity is ambiguous. Proof. See the online appendix.
The expression in equation (21) is the empirical counterpart to equation (16) in the frictionless case. In contrast to the case of bilateral changes in trade costs, the elasticity of bilateral trade flows with respect to multilateral changes in trade costs can be either positive or negative in theory. If it is positive, it is likely to be far below the gross elasticity that one would compute ignoring MR. The theoretical origin of this result lies in the endowment economy studied here and in AvW. Changes in trade costs serve to reallocate output from one destination to another so that multilateral trade cost changes can mean that exports become redirected from one importer to another even if the bilateral friction between all country pairs falls. A fall in bilateral trade can be explained by the overall bilateral cost rising relative to the cost of importing from or exporting to alternative destinations. 18 Part b (i) of implication 1 replicates AvW's implication 1 in the environment in which we Taylor-approximate MR. It states that countries exporting to larger importers have larger elasticities of bilateral trade when multilateral trade liberalization takes place. The reason is that larger countries typically trade a smaller fraction of their output internationally, instead trading proportionately more domestically. This means that large countries are less affected by MR, which means that the dampening effect of MR on trade elasticities is smaller for large countries. This remains true in our case as long as the extensive margin does not respond to trade liberalizations (ϕ ij = 0).
Part b (ii) of the implication arises because lemma 1 acts against part b (i) of the implication when the extensive margin is in operation. Larger countries have smaller gross elasticities due to the extensive margin being less responsive, but they also have smaller MR effects, so the theoretical relationship between country size and elasticity breaks down. Therefore, the sign of the elasticity and its 18 In parallel, the worldwide reduction in trade frictions is associated with a rise in factor costs, which reduce demand. To see the interplay between MR and factor costs, consider what happens to trade between i and j when trade barriers between j and a third country h = i fall, but the bilateral barrier between i and j remains unchanged. This manifests itself as a fall in j's exporter MR. At the same time, higher demand from the third country bids up j's factor costs. The higher factor costs make j's goods more expensive in i and, given the barriers between i and j remain constant, this lowers demand from i. So the fall in exporter MR makes supplying goods to i less attractive in relative terms, while the rise in factor costs reduces demand by i. This general equilibrium channel can be strong enough to reduce bilateral trade between i and j even when the i-j trade barrier is not constant and actually falls along with other third-country trade frictions, as in a multilateral liberalization. correlation with country size is an empirical matter, which requires implementation using . Moreover, there are only about 2,300 positive elasticities out of approximately 11,000 trade flows, so implication 2a is relevant empirically. 19 The theoretical analysis introduced the opposing forces in the relationship between country size and the elasticity: bigger pairs have bigger MR multipliers but lower gross elasticities due to the extensive margin. For multilateral changes, the correlation between ξ M ij and s i + s j is 0.490. This positive correlation, which is illustrated in figure 2, implies that the effect due to MR is stronger than that due to the extensive margin in the multilateral case.
The general equilibrium effects we are describing are so strong that most country pairs reduce their bilateral trade after reductions in their frictions and trade is redirected elsewhere. Given the endowment economy model studied here, negative export elasticities with some destinations should have offsetting positive elasticities with others. For consistency with theory, therefore, each exporter must have at least one import destination with which it has a positive export response. Empirically, this happens for every exporter in our sample, but G7 importers are responsible for half of the positive elasticities. Putting it starkly, most countries trade a lot more with 548 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS .5 Combined GDP shares of world GDP the G7 and less with almost everyone else. After a reduction in trade frictions, they reduce their exports to most smaller countries to be able to expand their exports to a handful of big countries.
Moving beyond bilateral trade responses, we aggregate the bilateral elasticities by exporter, weighting each bilateral elasticity by the volume of exports. As should be the case after aggregating across all export destinations, all countries see an aggregate increase in exports even after accounting for MR. The mean aggregate elasticity is only 0.29, while one-third of our countries have elasticities of less than 0.1, a small fraction of the elasticity implied by OLS. Researchers who are interested in the comparative static impacts of trade costs for a particular country are being particularly misled by estimates based on gravity model coefficients that ignore general equilibrium.
Some studies use gravity models to simulate the effects of multilateral reductions in trade barriers on global trade (Wilson, Mann, & Otsuki, 2005) . It is interesting to calculate similar worldwide elasticities, which we report in table 5. If we ignore both MR and firm heterogeneity, the implied worldwide impact would be the linear estimate of γ reported in the first row of the table. Using the same estimates but allowing for MR yields a much lower global impact, as shown in the second row. In the third row, we allow for the extensive margin of trade to operate, such that aggregating across all bilateral elasticities yields a world elasticity ξ gross of 1.291. This is close to the minimum bilateral elasticity presented in table 1 because the world's biggest economies, which have a large weight in the aggregate elasticity, tend to have the lowest individual elasticities. For global elasticities (unlike bilateral elasticities), the intensive margin accounts for over 60% of the trade increase and the gross elasticity is about 10% higher than that implied by OLS. Recall that there was no effect on country entry after a 10% fall in distance.
Once we account for MR effects, however, worldwide elasticities are much lower. As reported in the fourth row of table 5, aggregation yields a worldwide net trade elasticity ξ M of 0.467, which is barely a third of the gross elasticity, and less than 40% of the elasticity implied by OLS. We draw the same conclusions from an analogous empirical implementation using the polynomial estimates instead. Therefore, existing gravity-based simulations of the global trade implications of multilateral reductions in trade barriers are seriously misleading.
In sum, table 5 confirms that MR dramatically reduces the responsiveness of world trade to a multilateral reduction in trade frictions. However, this masks the reorientation taking place bilaterally. We saw that most bilateral trade elasticities are negative despite the larger gross elasticities generated by effects at the extensive margin. This dramatic impact is pervasive but greater among smaller trading pairs and shows the redirection of exports away from most export destinations toward the G7.
V. Conclusion
We have presented a gravity model for which we have computed comparative statics that account for the effects of both firm heterogeneity and multilateral resistance. To do so, we imposed general equilibrium closure on Helpman et al.'s (2008) gravity model, rendering it comparable to Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) system while preserving asymmetries in trade frictions and zeroes in the trade data. Adapting Baier and Bergstrand's approximate multilateral resistance (MR) terms to the case of firm heterogeneity allowed us to compare the effects of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalizations in a context that accounts for both the extensive margin of trade and the importance of relative trade costs in determining equilibrium responses.
In general, the presence of firm heterogeneity tends to increase the effect of trade cost changes on trade flows, and the amplification is larger for smaller countries. Therefore, even if one is not interested in the margins of trade, they need to be considered when estimating the overall trade TRADE FLOWS, MULTILATERAL RESISTANCE, AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY 549 response. The effects of firm heterogeneity will typically be dampened by MR, however. Except for the largest countries, the dampening due to MR effects is small for bilateral changes in trade costs. One implication is that most analyses of trade agreements between two countries (and, by extension, a handful of small countries) can ignore MR for practical purposes.
By contrast, large effects due to MR emerge after multilateral changes in trade costs (for example, a comprehensive new multilateral trade agreement) are considered. The theoretical sign of the bilateral trade response is ambiguous, and we find empirically that most bilateral trade elasticities are negative. Because large countries are less affected by MR, exports get reoriented from small importers to large importers. 20 A further implication is that the world trade response to a multilateral liberalization is positive but less than 40% of that implied by standard approaches that ignore MR. Properly accounting for MR may contribute, for example, to explanations of why dramatic worldwide transport technology improvements did not make a commensurately large contribution to trade increases over time (Behar & Venables, 2011) .
